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THE PHILOSOPHY OF CODE PLEADING*
The first steps in the path of civilization
are the formation of a system of law and its use in
litigation* When this step is taken jurisprudence has
its birth. In its beginngs it is crude and unsatis-
factory,it is narrow;r and inflexible but later in its
development it becomes a science. It is called into
being by the wants of society and,having at its found-
ation the principaJs of justicethe -hilosophy of
human law must eventuilly come to the surface. WThen
it does come to the surface,then it is that juris -
prudence as an agent and a science becomes a potent
servant of abstract justice and the legal and more.l
rules become more in unison, litigation,t is true,is
an evil and a burden upon society,but it is an evil
which must be born as a refuge from greater ones.
The first step in litigation is the pleading.
During the earliest period of the development of the
Roman laTr of which there can be found any traces,and
for a long time subsequent to the decemviral legisla-
tion known as the Twelve Tablos,the-ne .-ire fivetactions"
by w:hich all civil rights c.uld be maintained. They
we-e arbitrary and necessaril/ narrow in their appli-
cation.Persons desiring to tahle advantage of these rem-
edies must perform various acts,repeat certain form-
al phrases and make all of the symbolic gest resw-
necessary to bring before the court the subject of
the litigation. These regulations were construed strict-
ly and a party omitting to perform the requirements
was driven from court and his case failed. The five
Roman actions were as follovs. Ist. Action by means of
a .ager. This was the oldest action and seems to have
been in most general use. In this action the plaintiff
brought the property claimed into court and wy holding
a rod over it claimed it. The defendant then did the
same.The plaintiff then offered to wager and his offer
was then accepted. The court then decided the wager. 2nd.
4.
Act4#k by demanding a Judex. In this case the Judex
took the place of our jury and might be called a jury
man. But little is known of this action but it is
thought that it was used where there -:,,as a dispute
as to the terms of an actual contract. 3rd.Action by
notice,wherein the plaintiff served a summons upon the
defendant to appear within thirty days. This action
was used whenever the terms of the contract were certain
and the onlv dispute was as to its performance. 4th. Act-
ion by arrestwhich was a proceeding by whicih the de-
fendant was arrested and brought into court. It is sup-
posed to have been a sort of a body execution. 5th.Action
by taking pledge. This was also an execution,being used
against property.
The object of actions wais to place within the
reach of the people modes whereby they might enforce rights
and redress wrongs. This object was not gained by the
technical practice under the five forms of actions. A
system containing so little philosophy must necessarily
give way to a more liberal method where a nation is con-
stantly in % process of development.
The Formula is the generic name given to the
system which followed. In this system we fin. the first
trace of the modern idea of pleading. Under this method
the parties came before the Praeter and made oral plead-
ings,which were taken &owj Oy the court.After the plead-
ings were drawn the facts were tried before a [uJ'<ex. New
formulae were adopted from time to time and the old ones
were extended. There was however another system of plead-
ing gradally inserting itsgelf into Roman practice at
this time. This system was that which by virtue of the
extiQrdinary jurisdiction of the praetor enabled hin to
try both the law and the fact. This became gradually en-
larged until it assumed r~eortions as our modern court
Passing from the practice of thei early Ro;ans let us
Cxamine for a moment the methods- of the English legists
under their first systematic pract~ice.Here as in Rome
the differgnt modes of proceeding in the redress of wrongs,
are known in the law as £1actions. They were divided into
"formed actions" and "actions on the case" The first
divis~ion are of the greater antiquity. They were certain
defined formes,each designed for some particular wrong.
The latter class was more extended and applied to class-
es of wrongs.
Pleadings in the English cornmon law act-
ions comprise all the alldgations during the course of
the action. The object of pleading ispto ascertain by a
process of alligations and denialsthe matters really in
controvery,to give the parties notice of the case which
they will be compelled to pros'cute or defend and the
speedy settlement of the cause. It is necessary that they
should be in writing in order to avoid departure from
the pleadings,which would cause endless altercation
All pleadings ever devised requiring a statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action or the defence,
imply a proposition of la,-. Issues miry be tendered eith-
er upon the truth of the facts or upon the truth of the
proposition of law. The issue of fact is tender-id by a
denial called The issue of law is
tendered by a denial called a demurrer
The plaintiff first states the facts consti-
tuting his cause of action. It is then necessary for
the defendant to file his answer, he may allege that the
matters set forth in the declaration do not constitute a
cause of action. This is a demurrer. He may deny the
truth of all the matters alleged,which is known as plead-
ing the general issue* He may deny part of the facts set
forth44A in the declarationor he may set up new matte'r
as a defence. This is called special pleeding. The de-
murrer closes the altercation by bringing the case at once
to an issue 72.t law. The issue of law is whether upon the
whole matter as declaredwhen admitted to be true, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover. That is , when we admit
the truth of the all~gations,by dermrring, we deny the
conclusions of law which the pleader drawrs from the same
allegations of fact. If on the other hand the defendant
wished to deny the truth of the "facts" alleged, he filed
a plea called a traverse. By means of this plea the party
could deny the whole matter set forth, or he might deny
any part of it. Again if the party wishod and the cir-
cumstances required, he could admit the the al3Agations
of his oppon yit to be true aird set up new matter as a de-
fence.Theroupon his opporent would file a traverse and
deny the alltgations averred in the plea. The matters
thus alleged and denied constituted the issue and it
was to try this issue that the jury .as called, In this
manner there might be several pleadings served by each
party before x an issue was reached. When a party alleged
a matter which his opponent wished to deny and that
alltgation was denied, the iszue was determined and the
cause ready for trial.
The. system ;hich prevailed in the later iJquity
courts was much the same-It contained the same feature
of numerous pleadings but dispensed with the fictitious
all4gations used to make the actions in law to conform
with the origifnal actions. The old features which were
discarded were the teciical requirements so peculiar to
primitive peoples. The philosophy of pleading was assert-
i-pg its~elf with the advance of human thought. It is
often asserted that this system is the only true found-
ation upon which to build a perfect system of pleading.
In reducing the issue to a small campass this is certain-
ly true, and in the hands of learned lawyers it may be so
:±n all respects.
When the first New York code was issued it
containe. the followinf provisqion,."The distinctions a6
tax between actions at law and suits in equity and the
formis of all such actions and suits heretofore existing
are abolished and,.shall be in this state but one form of
action for enforcement and protection of private rights
and the redress of private wrongs,which shall be denom-
inated a civil actions. It might seem that by this stieep-
ing provission, the New York legislature had ,by a single
blow,ar.ihilated the whole system of ancient English rem-
edies. This however would be a mistaken conception. The
common law and equity systems Were founded upon a deep
seated and stable philosophy which xxx ,vere not discard-
ed by this legislation. The old forms were abolished but
the old causes of action were still in existgnce4 We
have in the place of a nimaber of pleadings a single one
but this single one must set forth ali the facts consti-
tuting the plaintiffs cause of actionhence it mus.t con-
tain al)of the st:tements found in all of the pleadings
in the old system. The answer is to set forth the whole
defence of the defendant and therefore contains all* of
the allegations which woul, be found in the many plead-
ings in the early systcm.The same result is reached as
by the use of the old system. The only exception to this
rule is where a reply is used. The defendant denies
certain or all the allegations in the coplaint and
thereby forms an issue- This is the cardinal purpose of
a system of pleading. It is necessary to define the issue
and bring before the juc.e or jury the point to be xe-
cided. Those who lament that th- entire syoten- of coyn-
on law pleadi,7 is abolished iy this new syst of plead-
in.- see 1 to confound t] e forum of thle act ion -,7ith the cc-ase
of action. Form is not substance. P1eilier are t e piead-
if-, oP fi Hv r~ 'J1r
r one great ai of the rule raking it nea es'-
a "v to -'(ducp all th'i? facts in issue betw en the part-
ies to writing is to bring before the court the real and
true matters in dispute. This purpose is attained by
requiring each party to state fully and accurately all
of the facts upon which they rely and by requiring their
denial to be truthfully made in detail. By requiring the
pleadings to be sworn to ,the courts do not permit either
party to allege any fact which is not true or which at
least he does not believe to be true,or to deny or con-
trovert any allegation which he knows to be true. It was
boasted that the coTynon law system of pleading was ar-
rainged to accomplish this very purpose .But a comparison
of it with the later systems shows that the contrary
must be true. All manner of false statements were alwiays
allowed and frequently actually required. This necessarily
would often work injustice. The real chriacter of a part-
y 4's cause of action or defence could be and often woS;
concealed behind a fiction. The party was not in fact
given notice of the action brought against him. It is
sometimes said that the party would know of the cause or
claim of his opponant and therefore would practically
have notice. But the very purp'ose of a pleading is to
give the opposing party actual notice and if we are to re-
ly upon his personal kno :;ledge why then have any more
than the summons. This objection it is true has been
greatfly r6duced by the reformi of the equity system. Nev-
ertheless it is also true that there is still room for
improvement in this systmi,if we look at it from the
standpoint of one accustomed to code pleading>
There is in the comon law system a distinction
between two classes of facts which i;Aunknown to the
later method.That is the distinction between the induce-
ment and the cause of action proper." Inducement and"gist
are conmon terms in the old system of pleading. This
distinction however does not portain to form only but to
the actual substance of the action. In the older systenm
inducement often consisted of a fiction. This is not
the means by which it is used in the later system. Here
it is used only when necessary to complete the parties
cause of action. It consists of extrinsic facts which
show the right of the particular person to bring the act-
ion or to answer,or the particular liability of the de-
fendant,where these matters are not set forth in the al-
ltgations showing the injury or defence* An exanple of
this would be an allegation setting forth title, encorp-
orat ion,&c.
A contract or legal instrument should be stated ac-
cording to its legal effect.(I Chitty on Pleading 312)%
This rule applies to all matters and instruments-.A party
is often tempted to set forth an instrument or other
facts in an untrue light. This rule compelis the party
to allege the contract in its exact words or to al-lege
it according to its exact and precise legal effect*.
Uncler the new practice the plaintiff may unite in
the same complaint several causes of action either legal or
equitable or both. They must however arise out of the
same transaction or transactions connected with the same
cause of action and must be of the same nature. It is
improper to join with an action for slander a count set-
ting up a cause of action upon breach of contract. The
causes of action which may be properly joined in the same
complaint may be found in all codes of procedure. (NYv
Code Civ. Pro.44 )
An action has been defined as a proceeding for
the redress or prevention of wrong. The cause of action
then must be the wrong itstelf.The facts set forth in
the pleading show the wrong and if there is no wrong
shown then the complaint is defective as not showing
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This m
may not be always in a neglect to allege allof the un-
lawful acts performed by the defendant. You may allege
all of the acts constituting trespass ,but if the plain-
tiff neglects to set forth title hc has failed to make
out a cause of action. The court frequently gives more
than one kind of relief for one wrong. The defendant
may owe a debt and it may also be secured by a mortgage.
A failure to pay this howeverwould constitute only a
single wrong. The plaintiff may sue on the debt or he
may foreclose the mortgage. The only way in which to
ascertain the precige cause of action is to take each
supposed cause of action4 and see if* taken alone it
states facts sufficient for recovery and then compare
the two and see if they have any common important facts.
If so they can be said to constitute a single cause of
action The reason for any rule limiting an action to
causes which are practically of the same nature is prob-
ably founded upo: a lack of confidence in the ability
of the average human mind to solve difficult or intricate
questions. It is simply a rule insisting upom simple
trials of fact when they must necessarily come before an
alerage jury of uninte~igent men. Another application
of what is practically the same rule is that not only
must the cause of action wAo be between the same part-
ies but must be concerning the same right. A defendant
cannot be sued individually and in the same action in
a representative capacity.
In discussing the foregoing rules ,e find that
our present jury system figures promingntly in the phil-
osophy of our modern code pleading as well as in the
older ie.hods. Experitnce has taught us that an ordinary
jut'y is not composed of ordinary men and tlie systcn of
pleading and in fact our whole practice must be shaped
in order to permit us to retain in our systerr. that
feature of which the only peculiarity and distinctive
characteristic is ignorance and inability to decide the
ordinary cases which would come before them were it not
for the provisions for their benefit .
It is also provided that the causes of action
must arise from the same transaction. "Transaction" is a
term including contracts and any acts or omissions be-
tweeiA the parties that may become the foundation of an
action.It is difficult to define accurately this word
derived from trans a . The practicting attorney,it
seems,often finds it difficult to avoid dividing up
his cause of action because his cause of action con-
gists of several items or parts or because he wishes to
demand more than one kind of relief. The other error
to be avoided is the uniting of two or more causes of
action in one because they are in some way connected.
All of these errors grow out of a mispconception of of
the precise wrong which is the precise cause of action.
Therefore the first question to be answered is the ques-
tior#What is the wrong of which the plaintiff complains?"
The wromg is the violation of the right. If the wrong
is the violation of several distinct rights it is still
but one cause of actiona for there is but a single wrong
But in performing a single act a person may become
guilty of a crime and a tort Here thcre are two distinct
causes of action from a single act. The only general
rule which can be fo-mulated is that after examining the
rights and wrongs and the redress demandedvo we find a
distinct line of demarkation between any parts of the
supposed cause of action it will be necessary to bring
two actions.
On the other hand a cause of action spring-
ing from a single transaction and of the same nature can-
not be separated into two or more causes of action*Ail
damages arising from a single wrong although performed
at differgnt times make but a single cause of action*
( 19 Wend. 207*)So a runpng zzcaount under a contract is
but a single cause of action. This rule however must not
be interpreted to allow a contract and a tort action
united in the same action although they arise from the
same act performed by the ;ame party-.
The New York code peri.ts a party to unite
in one pleading several causes of action where they all
arise out of the same express or implied contract. Under
the conmon law system it was allowable only to unite
causes of action springing from similar contracts. This
was adopted entirely for the benefit of the jurors.But
inasmuch as with the development of people3 and systems
of law the individual also develops,it is in these later
days found to be unnecessary to make the restrictions
favoring the modern jury as strict as in former times.
Still it is necessary to limit the cause of actiont for
it is a sad truth that the brain of the modern juror
is as yet by no means in a perfect state of development4
The classes of wrongs which may be united in
a single action are ,
For personal injury ( with few exceptions).
Libel and Slander.
Injury to real property.
Ej e ctment,
Detention of chattels.
Causes connected with the spne transaction.
All of these except the last are adopted from the sEaIme
considerations as the first,viz-in order to make it more
easy for the jury to understand.
The reply is a pleading which is served by
the plaintiff after receiving the defendants answer .In
the reply are concentrated all the functions of the sever-
al pleadings in the con-on law system. When a reply is
required is often a question. But the general rule seems
to be ,if the answer sets forth any new matter which,
if standing alone ,would constitute an affirmative cause
of action* it requires a reply. Any new matter alleged
in the answer which is nly for the purpose of contro-
vcrting the cause of action alleged in the complaint
does not require a reply. The law ss set forth in the
case' is that only a counterclaim requires a reply but
the difficulty then presents itsoelf when we attempt to
answer the question"What is a counterclaim?". There are
also cases which declare that a set off does not requie-
a reply. This is correct if we accept the term set off
as designating only such claims as refer either directly
or indirectly to the subject matter of the cause of act-
ion set forth in the complaint. But on the other handwe
accept the term set off as designating a subdivision of
a counterclaimthese cases are not consistetnt with the
true theory of the reply.
The only ground for 4 demurrer which will be
discussed here are
I That there is another action pending between the part-
ies concerning the same cause of action,*
2, That the causes of action are improperly joined.
3, That the complaint does n~t contain facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.
The ground first stated is one which would suggest its-
self at once to the student. The object of an action is
to give an irjurcd party a remedy for his wrong.When
that action is prosicuted to its end the remedy is en-
foreed an, the wrong is redressed or the right protect-
ed.W7hen this is accomplished the logical conclusion of
the law is that the grievance no longer exists. It would
therefore be folly to bring a second action to= enforce
a remedy when there is no logical-y wrong to be redressed.
It is upon this theory the rzle of demurrer which pro-
vides against Niatwo actions pending concerning the same
wrong is placed. One of the actions will be sufficient
and the plaintiff is allo;ed but one. It must be clearly
shown however that the parties are identical and that they
are seeking the same remedy for the same wrong in both
cases.
The second ground for demurrer which we arc
to consider we have mentioned before. It is as we have
seen founded principally upon the prev~lJnt lack of
confidence in the average juror, Causes of action must
be similar or connected with the smne transaction in
order to go before the jury for decis~ion * This is
solely for the purp~ose of enabling the jurors to under-
stand the issues and to permit them to congider the con-
trovercy with more or less inteligince. In order to ascer-
tain whether or not this objection applies to a complaint
or an answer it is necessary for the party to examine
carefully the whole pleading.
The last ground which we may properly exam-
ine is that the pleading does not contain facts suffic-
ient to constitute a cause of action. This is simply a
denial of the implied proposition of law contained in the
pleading. It is an admission of all of the allegations
contained therein and an assertion that they do mot show
that the party has suffered any wrong. A party may demurp
to the whole of the complaint or to a single cause of act-
ion contained therein.
Whenever a demurrer is served the court will
examine all of the pleadings and set aside the first de-
fective pleading- This rule was adopted to induce care
on the part of all parties drawing up pleadings. It is
almost the only safeguard against the inacuracy which
is too often found among those practicing in what are
known as code states.
What then is the philosophy of pleading? The philosophy
of code pleading is necess-'ryly the philosophy of all
pleading and of all law. The principals which underly
pleading are the source and foundation of all legal phn-
yomena and practice. The law is developed and made iden-
tical with moral law br the ever changing wants of so-
ciety. It is by means of the wants of man that civiliz-
ation becomes an entity in stead of a mere scheme. So it
is the requirements of a people that brings unto its
members a logical system of logical rules which are certai;i
reasonable, congistant with customs and innemorial.*The
greatest good to the gqatest number" was proclaimed by
the ancient philosophers to be both the great saurce and
end of all philosophy. Those philosophers were utili-
tarians.The philosophy of all law is cxjxK prinari~ly and
e
only utility. The crucial question then to be answerwd is
"71hat will result in the greatest good to the greatest
number?" 71hen that is answered we have the key to a
perfect system of law, and pleading. The early systems
contained all of the princip& of' pleading relating to
the exposition of the issues but it was left for the
later legists in our modern codes to bring forward in an
immeasurably more efficient manner' the indispensable
factor of utility. "The stone which the builders refused
is become the head stone of the corner." The corner-stone
of a true system of pleading is and always must be SIMPLIC-
ITY,*

